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INTRODUCTION
directors ostensibly play be diminished when CEOs are permitted to take unilateral actions such as the one in the Disney case? Indeed, what adverse impact on corporate governance will resonate when extraordinary business decisions such as these can be taken by the CEO?
Ironically, in spite of the Delaware Supreme Court' s consistent support, at least in theory, for independent directors to play a meaningful role in corporate governance, 8 this decision in practical effect gives undue deference to extraordinary unilateral actions implemented by dominant CEOs.
II. THE MAGIC KINGDOM: OVITZ, EISNER & DISNEY
For our purposes here, the Disney saga tragically begins with the death in April 1994 of Frank Wells, the then-president and chief operating officer of the Walt Disney Company (" Disney" ), in a helicopter crash. 9 CEO Michael Eisner temporarily assumed the presidency of the company until his diagnosis with heart disease hastened Disney' s need to hire a new president. 10 Eisner looked to his long-time friend Michael Ovitz, founder of Creative Artist
Agency (" CAA" ) and " one of the most powerful figures in Hollywood." At the time, Ovitz was involved in discussions with Music Corporation of America (" MCA" ) to serve as chairman and CEO of MCA. The terms being negotiated offered Ovitz 3.5% of MCA, $1.5 million in Seagram shares, and a seven-year contract, with a renewal option, that paid a seven-figure salary with performance-based cash bonuses. 12 For various reasons, however, no agreement was consummated, 13 and Ovitz returned to CAA until he learned that his close friend and associate at CAA was leaving for MCA. 14 See Kim Masters, The Power Shuffle: For the Titans of Tinseltown, A High-Stakes Game of Musical Chairs, WASH. POST, Aug. 20, 1995, at G1; see also 907 A.2d at 701. Ron Meyer, Ovitz' s close friend and partner at CAA, left the agency to join Universal (formerly MCA, the company with which Ovitz himself had been negotiating). STEWART, supra note 13, at 202. 15 907 A.2d at 702; see also STEWART, supra note 13, at 213. 16 Weinraub, supra note 10, at A35; STEWART, supra note 13, at 212-13; see also 907 A.2d at 703. $23.6 million per year, with a two-year renewal option that would raise the estimated value to $24.1 million per year.
17
A term sheet for the agreement (but not the actual agreement) was eventually presented to the compensation committee of Disney' s board of directors, which met for a total of one hour to consider Ovitz' s employment as well as four additional unrelated matters. 18 At that meeting, the compensation committee unanimously approved the general terms of the agreement. 19 At subsequent executive and regular sessions of the board of directors, the board deliberated further, voting unanimously to hire Ovitz as president. The compensation committee met one more time to consider certain issues relating to " stock options;" at the conclusion of this meeting, the compensation committee ratified the entire employment agreement.
20
The terms of the employment agreement consisted of an annual salary of $1 million and a performance-based discretionary bonus. The agreement also included two tranches of stock options that would provide Ovitz downside protection. The contract contained a five-year term,
with an extension and renewal option. Finally, both parties were protected from premature termination of the employment agreement. 21 This topic will be explored further below.
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In the other hypothetical situation, there would be concurrent removal power if " the governing instruments expressly placed the power of removal in both the board and specified officers." 47 According to the court, however, Disney' s governing documents " could reasonably be interpreted either way" and are " ambiguous" because they " do not vest the removal power exclusively in the board, nor do they expressly give the Board Chairman/CEO a concurrent power to remove officers."
48
Based upon this ambiguity, the Delaware Supreme Court resorted to rules of construction (including the rules of construction relating to the interpretation of contracts) to determine 43 Id. at 69. 44 Id. 
B. Whistling While We Work: Construction of Disney' s Governing Documents
Consistent with the Delaware Supreme Court' s opinion, this article likewise begins its analysis in the same manner: with the governing documents of the Walt Disney Company. As the opinion states, the certificate of incorporation provides that officers " shall hold their offices 49 Id.
50 Id. at 69-70. 51 Id. at 70. 52 The court refers to the testimony of several board members and General Counsel Sanford Litvack. Id. at 69-70. 53 See id. at 69.
for such terms and shall carry out such duties as are determined solely by the Board of Directors, subject to the right of the Board of Directors to remove any officer … at any time with or without cause." 54 This language describes the authority of the board over officers' tenures and duties. Officers are to hold their offices " for such terms" as are determined " solely" by the board of directors. Thus, the court reads this statement and applies " solely" to the right of the board of directors to determine the terms and duties of officers. The following phrase, which describes the power to remove officers, does not repeat the word " solely." In fact, it provides that such officers are " subject to the right of the Board of Directors to remove any officer."
55
The Delaware Supreme Court accordingly adheres to a questionable interpretation of Disney' s certificate of incorporation; because the word " solely" is not repeated before the right of removal, the phrase is construed as not granting an exclusive right of removal to the board of directors. 56 Unfortunately, the court expends little effort in ascertaining whether the certificate of incorporation provides for exclusive board authority for this matter. Indeed, while the word " solely" vests the Disney board of directors with the exclusive right to determine the terms and duties of offices and officers, query whether the term " solely" should be read to apply to the phrase that immediately follows regarding the removal of officers.
Based on the Supreme Court' s decision, although not for certain, the court apparently deems important the presence of the comma before the phrase " subject to the right of the Board 54 Id. at 68. 55 Id. Although the chancery court opinion does not explicitly address this issue, Chancellor Chandler reads the certificate of incorporation and the bylaws, as well as the board resolution electing Ovitz as president, to create a concurrent power of removal. 907 A.2d at 774. The chancellor relies on the language of the documents, the custom and practice of Disney, and the " implied authority" of the chief executive officer to reach the conclusion that the certificate of incorporation did not deprive Eisner of the power to remove Ovitz from the company' s presidency. Thus, the Delaware Supreme Court in Disney evidently placed undue reliance on the presence of the comma between the phrase bestowing upon the board the sole power to determine terms and duties and the phrase subjecting those officers to removal by the board.
While punctuation may provide assistance in construing Disney' s certificate of incorporation, the comma alone should not be sufficient to create what the court considers an ambiguity.
As important, the fact that the word " solely" is separated from the phrase addressing officer removal does not necessarily mean that the two phrases should be read in strict isolation.
Indeed, perhaps the more reasonable construction is that the term " solely" applies to both the power to determine terms and duties and the power to remove officers with or without cause.
Such a reading becomes more compelling when considering that the phrase " subject to" seems to connect the two clauses together, thereby suggesting that " solely" should apply to the removal clause as well.
Furthermore, Delaware adheres to an objective theory of contracts, applying the plain meaning rule in construing contracts which presumes that " the language of a contract governs when no ambiguity exists." 63 This rule presumes that the intent of the parties is to be determined by giving the contract terms " their ordinary meaning" and that such meaning " should not be The court next seeks to read further ambiguity into the certificate of incorporation provision by considering it in conjunction with the bylaws, which provide that the CEO " shall, subject to the provisions of the Bylaws and the control of the Board of Directors, have general and active management, direction, and supervision over the business of the Corporation and over its officers." 67 Taken together, the court finds that Disney' s corporate governing documents are ambiguous, thereby enabling the court to consider legal rules of construction and extrinsic evidence to resolve the ambiguity. 68 However, whether these provisions should be read as being ambiguous and thereby necessitating application of rules of construction and extrinsic evidence is a difficult question that the court declined to analytically resolve.
On their face, it may be asserted that the certificate of incorporation and bylaws 69 do not create the requisite ambiguity. As such, resort to extrinsic evidence therefore becomes unnecessary and indeed impermissible if Delaware adheres to the " plain meaning" rule. It is true that " where the language is not expressed with that clarity of expression which permits of but one reasonable interpretation, the language must be said to be ambiguous, and resort must be had 65 Likewise, Delaware law declines to give " legal sanction to agreements that have the effect of removing from directors in a very substantial way their duty to use their own best judgment on management matters." 89 Delaware courts hold that such delegation is an " abdication" of directorial authority. 90 The concept of abdication is similar to the concept of " sterilization," although the analysis shifts its focus: in sterilization, the focus frequently is on the shareholders and shareholder agreements, 91 while in abdication, the analysis generally focuses on action or inaction by the board of directors itself. 92 In this respect, query whether the Disney board of directors abdicated its essential statutory duties.
As of December 12, 1996, the date on which Eisner, Litvack, and Ovitz memorialized the termination, the fact-finder found that " the Disney board had never met in order to vote on, or even discuss, the termination at a full session, and few if any directors did an independent investigation of whether Ovitz could be terminated for cause." 93 Likewise, much like the full board, " neither the [executive performance plan committee] nor the compensation committee had a vote on the matter, and it seems as though they had yet to have a substantive discussion of whether such termination could be made for cause suggests an abdication of directorial duty.
Not only was the board of directors not given the opportunity to vote on Ovitz' s termination, the matter was never substantively discussed at a duly convened meeting. Nor is this a case where authority was delegated to an appropriate committee of the board of directors, 95 as neither the compensation nor any other committee focused on the matter of Ovitz' s termination. Rather, the decision to fire the president and putative " de facto chief operating officer" 96 of the company was made solely by Eisner with input by a select few others. In this respect, it must be remembered that the " mere fact that directors are gathered together does not a meeting make." 
D. Creative Artists & Agency
This brings the analysis to perhaps its most important point: agency. Indeed, having examined the language of Disney' s governing documents and the principles of Delaware corporation law, there remains the critical task of discerning Eisner' s authority as chief executive officer under the scope of agency law. Remarkably, this issue was never addressed by the Delaware Supreme Court. Under the law of agency, in construing the enforceability of contracts entered into by the corporation at the direction of a high-level corporate officer such as the CEO, numerous courts have relied on principles of actual authority and inherent agency power.
98
The Third Restatement of Agency describes actual authority as " when, at the time of taking action that has legal consequences for the principal, the agent reasonably believes, in accordance with the principal' s manifestations to the agent, that the principal wishes the agent so to act." 99 The key examination for actual authority thus rests with the principal' s manifestations to the agent. Actual authority may be either " express" or " implied." Generally, " express authority" refers to actual authority that a principal has expressed in a detailed or specific manner. 100 Implied authority generally includes the agent' s authority " to take action designated or implied in the principal' s manifestations to the agent and acts necessary or incidental to achieving the principal' s objectives, as the agent reasonably understands the principal' s manifestations and objectives when the agent determines how to act." 101 In both express and implied actual authority, the authority is derived from the relationship between the principal and the agent, based on either manifestations or statements from the principal to the agent. In contrast to actual authority, apparent authority involves the reasonable belief held by a third party. Apparent authority may be defined as " the power held by an agent or other actor to affect a principal' s legal relations with third parties when a third party reasonably believes the actor has authority to act on behalf of the principal and that belief is traceable to the principal' s manifestations." 104 Thus, the power of an agent under apparent authority may be determined based upon the manifestations between the principal and the third party. This is because the third party must have a reasonable belief that is " traceable to the principal' s manifestations."
Apparent authority therefore does not require manifestations between the principal and the agent, 102 AGENCY THIRD, supra note 99, § 3.01 cmt. b. 103 Assuming the certificate of incorporation properly authorized the CEO to terminate officers unilaterally, the question then arises whether such delegation would be valid as a matter of law. Such an inquiry becomes a matter of delegation and abdication, rather than a matter of agency. Under Delaware law, the operative inquiry would be whether such delegation removes from the board its duty of oversight so as to violate section 141(a) of the Delaware General Corporation Law. This question is distinct from whether a transaction is " extraordinary"for the purposes of agency power. For further analysis of delegation and abdication, see supra notes 78-97 and accompanying text; for a discussion of what is " ordinary" and " extraordinary," see infra notes 122-44 and accompanying text.
use of the term " inherent" authority. 111 Because of the difficulty in separating these two concepts, they will be considered together (along with what is often called " implied" 112 authority).
Inherent authority has been found to provide broad powers to an agent based upon the customary authority of the agent. In Menard, Inc. v. Dage-MTI, Inc., 113 for example, the Indiana Supreme Court found that inherent authority bound a corporation to a contract executed by its president. In Menard, the court held that an agent acts with inherent authority when engaging in transactions that usually accompany or are incidental to transactions which that agent is authorized to conduct, provided the third party reasonably believes that the agent is authorized and has no notice to the contrary. 114 In reaching this decision, the court recognized that the president of a corporation is one of the officers through which the corporation normally acts. As a result, the court found that the president' s actions were those that " usually accompany or are incidental to transactions [in which he was] authorized to conduct."
115
Generally, the prevailing view is that the " president of a corporation is empowered to transact, without special authorization from the board of directors, all acts of an ordinary nature which are incident to the office by usage or necessity and to thus bind the corporation. . 114 Id. at 1212. 115 
Id. (citations and quotations omitted).
116 FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 559 (2007). Thus, " the president of a corporation has no apparent authority to bind the corporation to an unusual, extraordinary, or unreasonable contract." Id. § 592.
inherent authority. Of course, when courts and treatises refer to the " president" of a corporation, they merely refer to the chief executive, whether that officer is referred to as " president" or " CEO." 117 References to the " president," for the purposes of this discussion, therefore, will not be intended to refer to Ovitz, but rather Eisner, as the chief executive officer of Disney.
Under Delaware law, a chief executive officer of a corporation may engage in ordinary 118 acts which are incident to his office, and " by virtue of his office he may enter into a contract and bind his corporation in matters arising from and concerning the usual course of the corporation' s business." 119 These powers inhere to the chief executive as a result of her position as such. As has already been discussed, however, these powers of the chief executive are not without limit under Delaware law. 120 Implicit in this analysis, therefore, is the concept that an agent' s authority may not exceed the " legitimate scope" of what is necessary to perform the agent' s delegated duties.
121

E. The " Incredibles" of the Transaction: What is Extraordinary?
Transactions authorized under the inherent or implied authority of a chief executive officer must, therefore, be ordinary. 122 The next step in the analysis of Eisner' s authority to unilaterally terminate Ovitz from Disney' s presidency thus rests with the nature of the transaction: was this an unusual or extraordinary transaction? Such questions regarding the ordinary or extraordinary nature of a transaction are usually questions of fact.
123
In one of his several opinions in the Disney case, Chancellor Chandler described the " corporate board' s extraordinary decision to award a $140 million severance package" to Ovitz. 124 It is interesting that the chancellor refers to the Disney board' s decision as " extraordinary," a decision that in fact was made by CEO Eisner. Also, in this casual reference to the payment, the chancellor chooses to use the word " extraordinary" to describe the determination. Of course, such casual language does not characterize the transaction as Chandler addresses the fact that, relative to the size of the corporation, the terms of Ovitz' s employment and termination seem small. 127 However, as is well recognized, quantitative magnitude is not the only factor to consider when analyzing the importance of a transaction; one must also consider the qualitative impact of the transaction to assess its overall magnitude.
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Significantly, although Chancellor Chandler recognizes the overall size of the corporation relative to the payment, he still describes the severance package as " extraordinary."
129
The qualitative features of a transaction cannot be ignored during analysis. For example, in the context of assessing qualitative materiality of a misrepresentation in a financial statement, the staff of the Securities and Exchange Commission (the " SEC" ) has promulgated Staff Accounting Bulletin 99 (" SAB 99" ). 130 Under SAB 99, the SEC staff advised that both the " quantitative" and the " qualitative" aspects of an item must be evaluated. To illustrate further, under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the term " extraordinary" payment has been defined as a payment " that would not typically be made by a company in its customary course of business." 139 The In Disney, Eisner, rather than the board of directors, fired the company' s president, thereby triggering a not-for-cause termination package totaling over $130 million; this $130-million payment compensated Ovitz for fourteen months of work in the Disney presidency. 142 In the words of Holman Jenkins of the Wall Street Journal, " nobody in the real world, not even in the far-out precincts of Hollywood, gets that kind of money for flubbing up after a year on the job." 143 In fact, Ovitz' s not-for-cause termination amounted to " the equivalent of more than 5,000 weeks of salary after just over a year on the job." 144 In the decision below, Chancellor
Chandler opined that " a reasonably prudent CEO … would not have acted in as unilateral a manner as did Eisner when essentially committing the corporation to hire a second-in-command, appoint that person to the board, and provide him with one of the largest and richest employment contracts ever enjoyed by a non-CEO." 145 Indeed, one reporter posed the question: " if somehow
Mr. Ovitz had earned that kind of payoff so quickly, why would Mr. Eisner push out such a valuable property, and so expensively?" 146 Thus, while the amount of compensation paid to
Ovitz in relation to the overall size of Disney may not be that immense, the gargantuan qualitative scope of the termination and subsequent severance payment have been well explored.
F. Ratification by the House of Mouse
Finally, the doctrines of ratification and estoppel provide alternatives to actual and apparent authority under agency law. Ratification refers to the " affirmance of a prior act done by another, whereby the act is given effect as if done by an agent acting with actual authority." 147 Ratification thus serves to confirm the legitimacy of a prior act on behalf of the principal. In a related matter, estoppel refers to situations in which an actor' s manifestations " induce[d] the third party to make a detrimental change in position." 148 When these manifestations have induced such detrimental reliance, the actor making the manifestations may be " estopped" from denying the transaction' s validity.
149
The timing of the ratification is an important element of confirming authority. 150 A critical distinction must be drawn, however, between ratification in the past for previous actions and ratification for a present action. Several Disney officers in the past had been fired without any action from the board of directors.
151
" Implied authority of the president of a corporation cannot be inferred from the fact that in other instances the president' s previously unauthorized acts have been ratified by the board of directors." 152 In other words, the concepts of ratification and implied authority must not be conflated when determining a chief executive' s authority to bind the corporation. Thus, when considering whether Eisner possessed the authority to terminate Ovitz independent of the board of directors, manifestations that may be deemed " ratifications" for past unauthorized terminations of other Disney officers cannot be considered a source for Eisner' s present inherent or implied authority to unilaterally fire Ovitz.
termination and severance are of an entirely different category. 
IV. A WHOLE NEW WORLD? IMPACT OF DISNEY ON GOOD GOVERNANCE & DIRECTOR INDEPENDENCE
In the current climate of corporate governance, great emphasis is placed on the concept of " independent" directors serving on corporate boards. In this regard, the major securities markets have rules requiring that all listed companies have a majority of independent directors. 155 For example, the New York Stock Exchange (" NYSE" ) requires that listed companies have a majority of independent directors as part of its corporate governance requirements. 156 In the NYSE' s commentary, it explains that requiring independent directors " will increase the quality of board oversight and lessen the possibility of damaging conflicts of interest." 157 NYSE rules also require that the nominating/corporate governance committee, compensation committee, and the audit committee be comprised entirely of independent directors. 158 Similarly, the NASDAQ Stock Market (" NASDAQ" ) contains a requirement that a majority of the board of directors of listed companies be comprised of independent directors. 159 In addition, the NASDAQ rules require that the compensation committee and the audit committee be comprised solely of independent directors. 160 addition, the NSYE rules identify certain relationships that defeat independence. Such relationships include being an employee of the company within the previous three years or having an immediate family member that was an executive officer within those three years;
receiving $100,000 in direct compensation (other than directors' fees and pensions) from the company during any twelve-month period within the previous three years; working for the company' s auditor under certain circumstances; serving as an executive officer of another company with respect to which any of the company' s present executive officers serve on such other company' s compensation committee; and being a current employee of a company that made payments to or received payments from the present company within the past three years if those payments exceed the greater of $1 million or 2% of the company' s consolidated gross revenues. 162 Each of these disqualifications also implicates directors whose immediate family members meet such criteria. 163 NASDAQ rules contain similar requirements and tests for 161 NYSE, Inc., supra note 156, § 303A.02(a). 162 Id. § 303A.02(b). 163 Id.
director independence. 164 Both stock exchanges also have rules requiring executive sessions to be attended by independent directors.
165
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act also contains requirements of independence. Under SarbanesOxley, the audit committee of a publicly-held company must be comprised solely of independent directors. 166 Sarbanes-Oxley has its own definition of " independence," separate from the definitions used by the stock exchanges; under Sarbanes-Oxley, a director is not considered independent for qualification as an audit committee member if such director accepts any compensatory fee (other than director fees) from the company or is an affiliated person of the company or any of its subsidiaries.
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" Affiliated persons" are defined generally to include those persons owning or controlling at least five percent of the outstanding stock of the company.
168
Furthermore, publicly-held companies must disclose in their annual proxy statements to their shareholders the names of the respective company' s independent directors, along with the 164 A director will not be considered " independent" if, during the preceding three years: he was employed by the company; with certain exceptions, he or a family member received over $100,000 from the company over any twelve-month period; his family member was an executive of the company; he or a family member was a partner, controlling shareholder, or executive of a company that paid or received the greater of $200,000 or 5% of the recipient' s gross revenues; he or a family member served as an executive of another company for which an executive of the present company served on the compensation committee; he or a family member participated in the outside audit of the company; or he is an " interested person" according to the Investment Company Act of 1940. NASDAQ, Inc., supra note 159, Rule 4200(a)(15).
factors establishing each director' s independence; in addition, the company must disclose any other information that it considered when making its independence determination. 169 Based upon these developments in the law, the Corporate Director' s Guidebook 170 states that in order to function most effectively, the board of directors of a public corporation " must exercise independent judgment in carrying out its responsibilities."reforms is to elevate the importance of the independent director in the corporate governance framework. 175 More specifically within Delaware case law, Delaware courts recognize, and indeed emphasize, the importance of independent directors. Vice Chancellor Strine has acknowledged that independent directors play, emphasizing the importance of independent directors in determining the good faith use of defensive measures in corporate takeovers.
180
With this current climate of corporate governance in mind, the wider implications of the Disney case become more apparent. This holding goes well beyond a mere reaffirmance of the business judgment rule. Rather, the Disney case raises serious questions about the efficacy of recent corporate governance reforms. The emphasis on director " independence" has been recognized by legislators, courts, regulators, the private sector, scholars, and observers alike.
Reforms have accentuated the need for " independent" directors to serve on boards in order to Eisner to a large extent is responsible for the failings in process that infected and handicapped the board' s decisionmaking abilities." 182 This is ironic in the face of the Delaware courts' own opinions emphasizing the importance of independent directors. If a corporate CEO has the authority the Delaware Supreme Court casually embraces in the Disney case, then how is the public to interpret that court' s own opinions extolling the presence of independent directors as a safeguard in corporate governance? The answer may well be that the court is perceived as engaging in mere " jawboning," declining to enforce these exhortations in the " real" world where serious money damages and other significant sanctions are at issue. 
